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Abstract 
Previously, personalized service was provided by traditional channel. Now, they are 
available online by using web channel. Some unique features of a web channel make it 
different from a traditional channel. Previous research has studied the competition 
between a web channel and a traditional channel from various angles. In this paper, we 
develop a model to examine the impact of switching costs and customer heterogeneity 
on the competition between an online fitness service provider and a brick-and-mortar 
fitness club which are all forward looking. Fitness service is used for illustration 
purpose. Our model can be generalized to all types of the personalized service. Contrary 
to previous research, switching costs in our model are asymmetric between two firms. 
We present a two-period game based on the well-established Hotelling model of the 
market. In order to maximize their profits, both the online fitness service provider and 
the fitness club offer different prices to their own customers and customers who switch 
from its rival. The results show that, in the case that firms are forward looking but 
customers are myopic, no matter it is the online firm or the traditional firm, if it has 
marginal cost advantage, then the impact of switching cost can be neglected, and the 
firm with marginal cost advantage should always take the “pay to switch” strategy in 
order to maximize its total profit. Otherwise, if marginal cost advantage does not exist, 
firms have to choose their pricing strategy based on their marginal costs and switching 
costs. In the case that both the firms and customers are forward looking, the switching 
costs do play a role in the firm’s decision making. The optimal pricing strategies vary 
depending on both the switching costs and marginal costs.  
Keywords:  web channel, asymmetric switching cost, Hotelling model, customer heterogeneity 
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Introduction 
Previously, firms have relied on traditional channels to develop their relationships with customers.  With 
the rapid development of technology, the number, type, and function of web channels have been 
increasing over the last few years (Ba et al., 2010). The web, a technology-driven distribution channel, has 
some unique features that differentiate it from other traditional channels. These features are: 
customization, interactivity, multimedia abilities, global access unconstrained by time and space 
limitations, easy to access, and the ability to conduct transactions in real time (Viswanathan, 2005). Both 
businesses and customers benefit from this technology development.  
Some services that can be provided face to face (more customized) traditionally are now being able to be 
provided online. In our paper, we define this group of services as personalized service. Some examples of 
these online services are fitness services (DailyBurn), financial planning services (Money Management, 
Ameriprise), legal services (LegalMarch, LegalZoom), and tutoring services (Tutor.com). The 
commonality among these services is that, traditionally, they are provided in a face-to-face way, but now, 
because of the development of technology, they can be provided online which is more convenient for the 
customer.  In this paper, we focus on the fitness service, and study it as a representative of this group of 
personalized services.  
In the past five years, the growth of traditional fitness facilities has slowed significantly, as have 
memberships in general, according to research from the International Health, Racquet and Sportsclub 
Association (IHRSA) (O’Rourke, 2011). Competition among fitness facilities has increased dramatically. 
Increasingly, alternative fitness offerings are creating options for consumers that don’t require monthly 
memberships or travel to a facility, such as online fitness providers. They entered the market to steal 
would-be weight losers from their bricks-and-mortar competitors (Mullman, 2010). Tony wells, the chief 
marketing officer at 24-Hour Fitness, says “Fitness isn’t just what happens when you are inside a gym” 
(Mullman, 2010). Jon Belmonte, chief media officer at Active Network, said “we believe studying the 
trends in what we are calling “social fitness” is worthwhile. It will help us and our partners to better 
understand the wants and needs of our extensive user base.” (Business Wire, 2011) 
Analysts largely agree that because only 18% of U.S. adults go to a health club on a regular basis, it is 
possible that the online programs may help to expand the potential customer pools for health clubs by 
selling new customers on a more-active lifestyle (Mullman, 2010). Although no definitive research proves 
that traditional health club is being directly affected by alternative fitness options, it is clearly a trend to 
watch. It is unclear as of yet whether users will find that social aspect as satisfying as a health club, but, 
from the industry perspective, it is surely a good thing to have cheaper competitors in the market. 
Therefore, the traditional brick-and-mortar club needs to consider its competition not only with other 
traditional clubs, but also with these alternative fitness offerings.    
As the industry rolls into 2011, more and more club operators are trying to incorporate the low-price 
model. However, instead of lowering prices to try to compete with the low-priced health clubs, DeCaire 
(2011) suggests that the local health clubs should raise their prices. According to an IHRSA’s research 
manager (2011), “consumers were very price-sensitive with respect to health club membership dues.” It is 
obvious that the fitness clubs face the dilemma that whether they should charge high price or low price, 
since customers are very price-sensitive. Life Time Fitness, one of two publicly held chains, saw 
membership rolls increase during the third quarter, but the average “in center” revenue per membership 
declined by $104 during that time, meaning members are paying their dues but cutting back on personal 
training and other goods and services sold at the gym (Mullman, 2010).  Therefore, finding the right price 
for their membership dues is not a trivial question for the traditional fitness clubs.   
If you cannot afford a personal trainer in a gym, you can get enough exercise and nutrition information by 
surfing on the internet. The convenience and social support of surfing for fitness guidance online can 
make it as effective as working with a trainer in person (Bush, 2011). In this paper, we consider a web 
channel that delivers fitness services. The web channel and the traditional fitness club compete on their 
personal training counseling service. The benefits provided by a traditional fitness club can be two-fold: 
one, it provides fitness equipment, and two, it provides personal trainers who can advise on a suitable 
fitness plan for each customer. In contrast, an online fitness website can provide a fitness trainer and 
online tracking tools to track a customer’s progress, but cannot provide training facilities. In our paper, 
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we focus on the competition between online and traditional fitness clubs with respect to the personal 
training services only. It is possible that the provision of online fitness services could induce customers to 
switch from traditional gyms, substituting equipment-based fitness activities with outdoor activities such 
as biking, running or walking. A customer who has been using a traditional gym and its in-house personal 
trainers could switch to an online fitness service and take up outdoor exercises (or work on a treadmill at 
home). Therefore, while at first glance online and offline fitness services don’t appear to be direct 
competitors, they could end up competing for customers who needs fitness counseling service. This may 
be reflected in the stagnating enrollment numbers for traditional fitness clubs (O’Rourke, 2011).  
There is a growing body of research that studies competition between firms using web channels. However, 
most of this research analyzes web channels in isolation, focusing largely on their efficiency-enhancing 
features. Moreover, Bakos (1997) mentions that other salient features of electronic markets, such as 
switching costs, are crucial for their strategic analysis. Viswanathan (2005) studies the impact of network 
externalities and switching costs on the cross competition between different channels. Hitt & Frei (2002) 
prove that customer heterogeneity has a great impact on a firm’s profitability when they adopt different 
distribution channels.  
For the personalized service, switching costs and customer heterogeneity are two crucial factors that 
impact service providers’ pricing choices to maximize their profits. Compared to switching from 
traditional channel to web channel, customers face a different switching cost when they switch from the 
web channel to the traditional channel. Previous marketing research has shown that there are differences 
between customers who choose a web channel and those who use a traditional channel (Hitt and Frei, 
2002). As for fitness, different people have different exercise habits. Therefore, when we study the online 
fitness industry, switching costs and customer heterogeneity are two factors that must be considered. 
Marketing research also studies price discrimination, which means that it is possible for a firm to charge 
one price to its loyal customers and a different price to customers who prefer its rivals’ products or service 
when all else are equal. Chen (1997) is the first one to study this price discrimination problem. He studies 
the case of “paying customer to switch”, which is also called “customer poaching” in Fudenberg & Tirole’s 
paper (2000). Instead of “paying customer to switch”, “paying customer to stay” is another possible 
strategy. Shaffer & Zhang (2000) study both of these two strategies when the demand of each firm and the 
switching cost are asymmetric.  
Little research has been done on the competition across different channels after considering both 
customer heterogeneity and the asymmetric switching costs. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap 
by examining how an online service provider could position itself to maximize profits in light of its 
competition with traditional service providers using the online fitness industry as a special case. We build 
a two-period game model to study the competition between two firms that provide substitutable service. 
One firm uses a traditional channel, and the other uses a web channel. The two firms have to decide on 
how much they should charge to their rivals’ customers and how much they should charge to their own 
customers in order to maximize their total profits.     
Therefore, the research questions addressed in this paper are: 
• Given asymmetric switching cost and customer heterogeneity, how does indirect competition 
between firms using different marketing channels affect their pricing strategies to their own customers 
and customers who switch from its rival? 
• Given three pricing strategies that are available for two firms: charging the same price to all its 
customers, charging lower price to its own customers, and charging lower price to customers who switch 
from its rival, which strategy is more profitable for an online firm? And which one is more profitable for 
the traditional firm? 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the related literature in the second section. In the third 
section, detailed information is provided on how the two-period game model has been set up. The fourth 
section focuses on the model solving process for the two cases. We get several propositions from the 
results and show them in the graphs. The conclusion and suggestions for future extensions are provided 
in the last section. 
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Literature Review 
Different cost function 
The costs involved in providing services through traditional and web channels are different. Shapiro and 
Varian (1999) have argued that the cost structure of the web channel has the characteristic of large fixed 
cost but low marginal cost. On the other hand, the traditional channel has the characteristic of a large 
variable cost.  
Most work on the profitability of web channel investment has emphasized potential cost savings through 
improved communication and coordination (Malone et al., 1987), or simply substitution of relatively fixed 
cost information technology assets for the variable cost of human interaction. Other research considered 
how revenues might be enhanced with web channels through price discrimination, product 
differentiation, or competitive advantages created by network effects (Clemons et al., 2002). Therefore, 
we need to pay attention to the difference in cost functions when we analyze the competition between 
these two channels. 
Customer heterogeneity 
Some research has focused on the issue of customer heterogeneity. In previous studies, customer 
characteristics have been treated as fixed or hypothesized not to vary between web and traditional 
channels. Hitt & Frei (2002) systematically examine how customer characteristics and behavior differ 
between traditional and web channels. Their results show that customers who use web channels are 
different in many ways from customers who use traditional distribution channels.  
Customer characteristics and profitability might be different in web channels. Some of the customer 
characteristics can translate into differences in customer behaviors and, ultimately, have effect on 
profitability. An online channel may have direct effects on customer behavior that lead to greater firm 
profitability (Hitt and Frei, 2002).  
Price discrimination 
Price discrimination is used to segment customers based on their willingness to pay different prices 
(Mehra et al., 2010). Chen (1997) studies the “pay to switch” strategy and finds out that both firms and 
customers are worse if firms adopt the price discrimination. Instead of only focusing on the “pay to 
switch” strategy, Shaffer & Zhang (2000) also study the “pay to stay” strategy. They find that it may be 
more profitable for firms if they charge a lower price to its own customers and price discrimination can 
lead to lower prices to all customers. Instead of analyzing which strategy a firm should choose, Shin & 
Sudhir (2010) study when a firm should offer a lower price to its own customers rather than to the 
competitor’s customers. Sundararajan (2004) finds that if a firm can price-discriminate, it is always 
optimal for them to choose a strictly lower level of technology-based protection in a market with digital 
piracy.  
Switching costs 
The ability to retain and lock-in customers in the face of competition is major concern for online 
businesses (Chen and Hitt, 2002). Zhou & Zhu (2006) study the platform battle with lock-in strategy, and 
find out conditions under which the lock-in strategy can benefit or hurt platform providers. Promotion 
and reward programs are two other widely used methods to develop customer loyalty and lock in 
customers (Kim et al., 2001). Sun (2005) uses a dynamic structure model to study the promotion effect on 
a endogenous consumption. Raju et al. (1990) analyze how brand loyalty determines the optimal price 
promotional strategies used by firms in a competitive setting. 
Therefore, one more factor that is particularly important in the context of competition is switching costs, 
which are incurred by customers who switch from one firm’s product or service to other firms’.  A rich 
stream of economic literature has focused on the impact of switching costs. Klemperer (1987 a, b) finds 
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that in the presence of switching costs, gaining market share becomes the goal of corporate strategy. 
Farrell & Shapiro (1988) analyze a duopolistic competitive model in the presence of customer switching 
costs and find that switching costs may encourage entry by new firms. These papers all assume that 
switching costs are exogenous. Researchers also study the impact of switching costs when they are 
endogenous (Demirhan et al., 2007).  
Switching costs have been analyzed in the business as well as in the economics literature. Chen & Hitt 
(2002) develop an approach for measuring the magnitudes of switching costs and brand loyalty for online 
service providers. Viswanathan (2005) studies the impact of network externalities and switching costs on 
the competition across different distribution channels. Demirhan et al. (2007) investigate the impact of 
switching costs on IT investment strategies of firms. Mehra et al. (2010) analyze the impact of switching 
costs when competitive upgrade discount pricing is used.  
In those studies, switching costs are taken as a given and same for both firms. The researchers just 
analyze the impact of them. However, in our study, the switching costs are asymmetric between two firms. 
In other words, switching cost from Firm A to Firm B is different from switching cost from Firm B to Firm 
A. Switching costs will not be taken as same, and simply analyzed for its effect. This is the major 
difference between our study and previous studies on switching costs.  
Viswanathan’s (2005) work is the most relevant paper. The author considered three types of firms and 
two types of customer, and assumed that online and traditional channels differ in just their channel 
flexibilities. In his paper, each firm sells a commodity product, but differentiates itself from its rivals by 
leveraging the characteristics of its own channel and innovating on the features of the buying experience 
associated with the products to offer different value propositions. The set of possible differentiated value 
propositions in each channel is modeled by representing the channel characteristics by a unit circle, and a 
firm’s choice of channel-related value proposition determines its location on the circle. As for switching 
costs, they assume that there are no switching costs in the traditional channel and switching costs incur 
between firms within a channel.  
Our work is different in the following way. First, in our paper, we consider two types of firms, the online 
firm and the traditional firm. Each firm sells the similar fitness counseling services. As for switching costs, 
we assume that switching costs incur between firms across the two channels.  Second, instead of assuming 
switching costs are the same for every customer, in our paper, we assume that people who switch from the 
online firm to traditional firm has a different switching cost compared to people who switch the other 
way. 
Model 
In this paper, the fitness service is just used for illustration purpose. Our model applies to each type of the 
personalized service, not just for fitness service. Therefore, our model does not account for the special 
characteristics of fitness clubs. Our model is based on the famous Hotelling model of the market 
(Hotelling, 1929). The market is characterized by customers who are uniformly distributed along a 
straight line of unit length in terms of their requirement and tastes. All the customers are utility 
maximizers and assumed to have a high reservation price, R, in comparison with their total costs. High 
reservation prices ensure that customers always purchase a unit of service.  
Customers are horizontally differentiated on the Hotelling line, it means customers do not have an 
agreement on which firm provides a better fitness counseling service. They will face a “fit” cost if a service 
does not perfectly match their requirement. We assume this cost is c and it is proportional to the distance 
between the location of the customer and the service being offered.   
There are two already established firms in the market. At here, “already established” means they have 
been running for some time. Firm A is an online fitness provider. Firm B is a traditional gym.  We assume 
that they provide the same fitness counseling services which have the same quality, so that firms can only 
compete on price, not quality, to maximize their profits. The marginal cost for Firm A’s is Am , and the 
marginal cost for Firm B is Bm . Usually online firms have different marginal costs than traditional firm, 
therefore we assume that A Bm m≠ .  
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There are two periods in this model. In each period, both Firm A and Firm B provide fitness counseling 
service to their customers. At the beginning of each period, they simultaneously choose their pricing 
strategy. Firm A and Firm B are forward looking and they maximize their total profits from both periods. 
At the end of the first period, Firm A’s market share is θ and Firm B’s market share is (1-θ). 
 
Figure 1.  Two-Period Model 
At the beginning of the second period, Firm A offers 2AP  to customers who stay with it in the second 
period and ABP  to customers who switch from Firm B. Similarly, Firm B offers 2BP  to customers who stay 
with it in the second period, and BAP  to customers who switch from Firm A.  We denote that there are Aψ  
percentage of Firm A’s customers who switch to Firm B, and Bψ  percentage of Firm B’s customers who 
switch to Firm A. Therefore, at the end of the second period, four segments of customers exist in the 
market. The first segment (AC) indicates the customers who stay with Firm A; the second one ( Aψ  θ) 
indicates Firm A’s customers who switched to Firm B; the third one ( Bψ (1-θ)) indicates Firm B’s 
customers who switched to Firm A; and the last one (DB) indicates customers who stay with Firm B. 
Switching costs incur when customers switch from Firm A to Firm B or vice versa at the beginning of the 
second period. Switching costs are considered asymmetric. For Firm A’s customers, their switching cost to 
Firm B is ABS , and Firm B’s customers’ switching cost to Firm A is BAS .  Customers who stay in the same 
firm have the same switching costs. Because the switching costs for people who switch from online fitness 
provider to the real gym is different from the switching costs for people who switch from the real gym to 
the online fitness provider, we assume that   AB BAS S≠ . 
The notation for the basic model is shown in Table 1, for , , i j A B=  and 1,2k =  
Table 1. Summary of the notations
 
c  The “fit” cost for customers 
θ  Firm A’s market share at the beginning of the second stage 
ikP  Firm i ’s price to its own customer at kth stage 
  ijP  Firm i ’s price to customer who switch from Firm j  
  im  Firm i ’s marginal cost 
  ijS  The switching costs from Firm i  to Firm j  
  iψ  The proportion of Firm i ’s customers who want to switch  
  ikπ  Firm i ’s profit at the end of kth stage 
  iπ  Firm i ’s total profit  
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Part one: firms are forward looking, but customers are myopic 
We assume that firms are forward looking, therefore, we first solve the second period and then solve for 
the first period. At the beginning of the second stage, Firm A offers 2AP  to customers who stay with it in 
the second period, and ABP  to customers who switch from Firm B. At point C in Figure 1, an individual 
customer from Firm A’s is indifferent between Firm A and Firm B if: 
( ) ( )A2 A BA AB AP c θ ψ θ P S c 1 θ ψ θ+ − = + + − +  
Solving this equation, we get: 
A2 BA AB
A
c 2cθ P P S
ψ                      (1)
2cθ
− + + − −
=  
Similarly, at point D in Figure 1, an individual customer from Firm B’s is indifferent between Firm B and 
Firm A if: 
( )( )AB BA B B2 BP S c θ ψ 1 θ P c(1 θ ψ (1 θ))+ + + − = + − − −  
Solving this equation, we get: 
( )
AB B2 BA
B
c 2cθ P P S
ψ                     (2)
2c 1 θ
− + + − +
=
− +
 
The profits for Firm A and Firm B in the second period are, respectively: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )A2 A2 AB 1 1A B A A BP P mπ θ ψ θ ψ θ θ ψ θ ψ θ= − + − − − + −  
B2 B2 BA(1 (1 )) ((1 (1 )) )B A B B AP P mπ θ ψ θ ψ θ θ ψ θ ψ θ= − − − + − − − − +  
Therefore, in the second stage, Firm A and Firm B are trying to find a pair
* *
2 , )( A ABP P , and * *2( ,  )B BAP P  to 
maximize their 2Aπ and 2Bπ . 
Solving the first order conditions, we get the following unique solutions which also satisfy the second 
order conditions: 
( )*2 AB
1 2 2                       (3)
3A A B
P c c m m Sθ= + + + +  
( )* BA
1 3 4 2                    (4)
3AB A B
P c c m m Sθ= − + + −  
( )*2 BA
1 3 2 2                    (5)
3B A B
P c c m m Sθ= − + + +  
( )* AB
1 4 2                   (6)
3BA A B
P c c m m Sθ= − + + + −  
From these optimal solutions, we can obtain that all these prices are functions of switching costs, 
marginal costs, “fit” costs, and the first period market share.  
The previous part described the second period of a two-period market in which second-period switching 
costs are created by first-period sales. We now consider the first period, in which consumers are not 
attached to any particular firm.  In the first period, a myopic customer is indifferent between Firm A and 
Firm B if: 
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A1 B1 (1 )P c P cθ θ+ = + −  
We find: 
 
1 1
                                                  (7)
2
A Bc P P
c
θ
− +
=  
In the first period, Firm A and Firm B choose their first-period pricing strategy A1 B1 and )(  P P to 
maximize their total profits. We assume that the discounted rate is one. The total profits for Firm A and 
Firm B for both periods are: 
A1 A2( )A AP mπ θ π= − +  
B1 B2( )(1 )B BP mπ θ π= − − +  
After solving the first order conditions: 
1 1
0,  0A B
A BP P
π π∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
 
We find the optimal solutions for A1 B1 and P P  which also satisfy the second order conditions: 
*
1 AB BA
1 (21 18 3 4 10 )
21A A B
P c m m S S= + + − −  
*
1 AB BA
1 (21 3 18 10 4 )
21B A B
P c m m S S= + + − −  
We substitute these two optimal prices into equation (7) and get the market share at the maximum profits 
is: 
AB BA7 5 5 2 2
14
A Bc m m S S
c
θ
− + − +
=  
Then, we substitute this market share to the equations (3)-(6), and get the optimal pricing strategies for 
Firm A and Firm B in the second period: 
*
2 AB BA
1 (14 9 12 5 2 )
21A A B
P c m m S S= + + + +  
*
AB BA
1 (7 24 3 4 11 )
21AB A B
P c m m S S= + − + −  
*
2 AB BA
1 (14 12 9 2 5 )
21B A B
P c m m S S= + + + +  
*
AB BA
1 (7 3 24 11 4 )
21BA A B
P c m m S S= − + − +  
We know that  and A Bψ ψ  are proportions, which means they can only get value from [0, 1]. Therefore, 
we substitute these optimal pricing strategies and the market share into equation (1) and (2) to get the 
boundaries for AB BA, ,  ,  and A Bm m S S :  
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AB
AB BA
7( )20 1          (8)
3 3(7 5 5 2 2 )
A B
A B
c m m S
c m m S S
− + +
≤ − ≤
− + − +
 
 
AB
AB BA
7(9 7 7 2 )110 1         (9)
6 6(7 5 5 2 2 )
A B
A B
c m m S
c m m S S
+ − +
≤ − ≤
+ − + −
 
 
We therefore have:                                                                                                                 
Proposition 1: There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the mature market under price discrimination 
when firms are forward looking but customers are myopic. In this equilibrium, each firm’s prices are 
depending on customers’ “fit” cost, its own switching cost and marginal cost, and also its rival’s switching 
cost and marginal cost.  
Proposition 2: when A B m m≤ , Firm A can always charge a higher price to its customers who stay with it 
in the second period and a lower price to customers who switch from Firm B. But when A Bm m> , 
depending on different relationships between AB BA, ,  ,  and A Bm m S S , Firm A can choose different pricing 
strategies to maximize its total profit. Similarly, for Firm B, when A Bm m≥ , pay to switch is always a 
dominant strategy for Firm B. But when A Bm m< , depending on different relationships 
between AB BA, ,  ,  and A Bm m S S , Firm B has to choose different pricing strategies to maximize its total 
profit. 
In the second period, for Firm A, the price difference between its own customers and the customers who 
switch from Firm B is: 
A2 AB A B AB BA
1P P (7c 15m 15m S 13S )
21
− = − + + +  
From this equation, we can observe that if A Bm m≤ , because AB BAS  and S  are always positive, the 
difference between A2 ABP  and P  is always positive ( A2 ABP P 0− > ). It shows that in the second period, 
Firm A can always charge a higher price to its loyal customers and offer a lower price to attract Firm B’s 
customers to switch to Firm A. In other words, Firm A can always use “pay to switch” strategy to attract its 
rival’s customers and increase its own profit. Why is this strategy profitable for the Firm A? That is 
because, when two firms provide the same service, Firm A could enlarge its market share by inducing 
more Firm B’s customers to switch.  Furthermore, when BAS  increases, which means it is getting harder 
and harder for Firm B’s customers to switch to Firm A, Firm A has to give a bigger discount to customers 
who switch from Firm B.  
But if A Bm m> , we can obtain that (1) when AB BA A BS 13S 15m 15 7c m+ = − − , A2P  equals to AB P , 
which means Firm A should charge same price to its loyal customers and customers who switch from its 
rival. (2) When AB BA A BS 13S 15m 15m 7c+ > − − , A2P  is greater than AB P , which means Firm A should 
charge higher price to its loyal customers than customers who switch from its rival. (3) 
When AB BA A BS 13S 15m 15m 7c+ < − − , A2P  is smaller than AB P , which means Firm A should charge 
lower price to its loyal customers compared to customers who switch from its rival. Similar analysis can be 
applied to Firm B. The optimal pricing strategies for Firm A and Firm B given different 
AB BA, ,  ,  and A Bm m S S  are summarized in table 2 and table 3. 
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Table 2. Optimal pricing strategies for Firm A  
Pricing Strategy 
A Bm m≤  A B
m m>
 
Charge the same price to all customers  
AB BA13 15( ) 7A BS S m m c+ = − −  
Pay to switch 
A Bm m≤  AB BA
13 15( ) 7A BS m cS m+ > − −  
Pay to stay  
AB BA13 15( ) 7A BS m cS m+ < − −  
 
Table 3. Optimal pricing strategies for Firm B  
Pricing Strategy 
A Bm <m  A Bm m≥  
Charge the same price to all customers 
AB BA13 15( ) 7B AS m cS m+ = − −   
Pay to switch 
AB BA13 15( ) 7B AS m cS m+ > − −   A Bm m≥  
Pay to stay 
AB BA13 15( ) 7B AS m cS m+ < − −   
 
From the above tables, it is clear that for both the online firm and traditional firm, when its own marginal 
cost is lower than or equal to its competitor’s marginal cost, it is possible for them to generate more 
revenue than its competitor. Furthermore, they could always use this part of revenue to offer a lower price 
to its competitor’s customers in order to induce them switch and enlarge the firm’s market share. In other 
words, “pay to switch” is always optimal for the firm. But if the firm’s own marginal cost is higher than its 
competitor’s marginal cost, “pay to switch” pricing strategy is not always optimal. A firm has to choose its 
pricing strategy based on the relationships between not only its own marginal cost and switching cost, but 
also its competitor’s marginal cost and switching cost.  In order to show the results in a more clear way, 
we put the results for Firm A and B into the following graphs. 
 
Figure 2.  Optimal Pricing Strategy for Firm A 
 
 
Figure 3.  Optimal Pricing Strategy for Firm B 
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The implication of above results is that the ability to charge different prices is the key to these results, 
since it enables each firm to charge different prices to its loyal customers and the customers switching 
from its competitors. Depending on the actual values of AB BA, ,  ,  and A Bm m S S , the online firm and the 
traditional firm can choose different pricing strategies so as to maximize their profits, like “charging the 
same price”, “pay to switch”, or “pay to stay”.  The common intuition for why a firm should always choose 
the “pay to switch” strategy is that, in doing so, it can generate profitable incremental sales without giving 
up any profit margin on its own customers. Shaffer & Zhang (2000) found that “pay to switch” is optimal 
when demand is symmetric and “pay to stay” is optimal when demand is asymmetric. The results in our 
study demonstrate that, no matter it is the online firm or the traditional firm, when its marginal cost is 
lower than or equal to its competitors’ marginal cost, switching costs do not affect the online and 
traditional firms’ pricing decisions. The two firms should always choose “pay to switch” strategy and offer 
its competitor’s customers a lower price. The impact of switching costs on the firms’ profits can be 
neglected. But if a firm does not have the marginal cost advantage, then switching costs do play a role in 
the manager’s pricing strategy decision. The manager should choose different pricing strategies based on 
its own marginal cost and switching cost and its competitor’s marginal cost and switching cost.  
Part two: both firms and customers are forward looking 
Now we consider that firms and customers are all forward looking, therefore, the results we get from the 
second period should remain the same. The assumption that customers are forward looking will only 
affect the results for the first period. Therefore, 
*
A2P ,
*
ABP , 
*
B2P  and  
*
BAP  for the second period are same as 
equations (3)-(6). 
In the first period, a forward looking customer is indifferent between Firm A and Firm B if: 
A1 BA AB B1 AB BA(1 ) (1 )P c P c S P c P c Sθ θ θ θ+ + + − + = + + + − +  
Solving this equation, we have: 
 
A B A1 B1 AB BA4c m m 3P 3P 2S 2Sθ                   (1 ) 0
8c
+ − − + − +
=  
In the first period, Firm A and Firm B choose their first-period pricing strategies ( A1 B1 and P P ) to 
maximize their total profits. We assume that the discounted rate is one. The total profits for Firm A and 
Firm B for both periods are: 
A1 A2( )A AP mπ θ π= − +  
B1 B2( )(1 )B BP mπ θ π= − − +  
After solving the first order conditions, we find the optimal solutions for A1 B1 and P P  which also satisfy 
the second order conditions: 
*
1 AB BA
*
1 AB BA
1 (16 9 3 4 4 )
12
1 (16 3 9 4 4 )
12
A A B
B A B
P c m m S S
P c m m S S
= + + − −
= + + − −
 
We substitute these two optimal prices in period one into equation (10) and get the market share at the 
maximum profits is: 
AB BA8 4 4
16
A Bc m m S S
c
θ
− + − +
=  
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Then, we substitute this market share in first period to the equations (3)-(6), and get the optimal pricing 
strategies for Firm A and Firm B in the second period: 
*
2 AB BA
*
AB BA
*
2 AB BA
*
AB BA
1 (15 9 4(4 ))
24
1 (9 3 4( 2 ))
12
1 (9 15 4(4 ))
24
1 (3 9 4( 2 ))
12
A A B
AB A B
B A B
BA A B
P m m c S S
P m m c S S
P m m c S S
P m m c S S
= + + + +
= + + + −
= + + + +
= + + − +
 
Similarly, we get the boundary for AB BA, ,  ,  and A Bm m S S :  
AB
AB BA
8( )20 1          (11)
3 3(8 4 4 )
A B
A B
c m m S
c m m S S
− + +
≤ − ≤
− + − +
 
 
AB BA
AB BA
6 6 8( 2 )0 1             (12)
3(8 4 4 )
A B
A B
m m c S S
c m m S S
− + + + −
≤ ≤
+ − + −
 
When both firms and customers are forward looking, we therefore have: 
Proposition 3: There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the mature market under price discrimination 
when both firms and customers are forward looking. In this equilibrium, each firm’s prices are depending 
on customers’ “fit” cost, its own switching cost and marginal cost, and also its rival’s switching cost and 
marginal cost.  
Proposition 4: Depending on different relationships between AB BA, ,  ,  and A Bm m S S , Firm A and Firm B 
have to choose different pricing strategies to maximize their total profits.  
In the second period, for Firm A, the price difference between its own customers and the customers who 
switch from Firm B is: 
A2 AB AB BA
1P P (8 3 3 4 20 )
24 A B
c m m S S− = − + − +  
From this equation, we can obtain that (1) when
AB BA4 20 3( ) 8A BS S m cm− + = −− , A2P equals to ABP , 
which means Firm A should charge same price to its loyal customers and customers who switch from its 
rival. (2) When
AB BA4 20 3( ) 8A BS S m cm− + > −− , A2P is greater than ABP , which means Firm A 
should charge higher price to its loyal customers than customers who switch from its rival. (3) when  
AB BA4 20 3( ) 8A BS S m cm− + < −− , A2P  is smaller than A2P , which means Firm A should charge lower 
price to its loyal customers compared to customers who switch from its rival. In the similar vein as above, 
one may find the optimal pricing strategy for Firm B. The optimal pricing strategies for Firm A and Firm 
B given different AB BA, ,  ,  and A Bm m S S  are summarized in table 4.  
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Table 4. Optimal pricing strategies for Firm A and Firm B 
Pricing Strategy Firm A Firm B 
Charge the same price to all 
customers 
AB BA4 20 3( ) 8A BS S m cm− + = −−  AB BA20 4 3( ) 8B AS m cS m− = − −  
Pay to switch 
AB BA4 20 3( ) 8A BS S m cm− + > −−  AB BA20 4 3( ) 8B AS m cS m− > − −  
Pay to stay 
AB BA4 20 3( ) 8A BS S m cm− + < −−  AB BA20 4 3( ) 8B AS m cS m− > − −  
 
From this table, we observe that, based on different combinations of marginal costs and switching costs, 
firms should choose different pricing strategies to maximize their profits. The reason for this result is that 
customers are forward looking in the first period. If customers are forward looking, when they make 
purchasing decisions at the beginning of the first period, they will consider their utilities not only from the 
first period but also the second period. Switching costs may reduce the firms’ profits because forward-
looking customers realize in the first period that they will be saddled with higher prices in the second 
period. Consequently, the firm must lower its price in the first period because of customers’ willingness to 
pay less for the service.  Switching costs may also increase the affinity of the current customers of a firm to 
stay with that firm in the long run. Therefore, when the customers are forward looking, the impact of 
switching costs cannot be neglected and firms have to take into account its impacts when they make 
decisions on their pricing strategies.  
Given the results in proposition 3 and 4, the online firm and the traditional firm should choose different 
pricing strategies based on the actual values of their switching costs and marginal costs. In the case that 
both firms and customers are forward looking, the results for the second period remain the same. But for 
the first period, since customers are also forward looking, when they make decisions, they not only 
consider the first period, but also the second period. In line with standard economic theory, forward-
looking customers are assumed to form expectations about the firms’ second-period pricing behavior 
(including the fact that firms can price-discriminate in the second period), which are realized in 
equilibrium. Therefore, in the first period, customers will recognize any incentive of either firm to deviate 
in the second period and adjust their buying decisions according to either firm’s expected pricing 
strategies. The optimal pricing strategies for this case (where customers as well as firms are forward-
looking) change a lot compared to the case where only the firms are forward looking. Under the 
assumption that both firms and customers are forward looking, the dominant strategies for each firm 
exist and vary depending on different pricing strategies according to their switching costs and marginal 
costs.” 
Conclusion 
Sitting in front of a computer is not an activity usually associated with physical fitness but getting online 
might be more beneficial for weight loss than joining a gym. For Americans seeking to get fit on their own 
time, online personal training is increasingly popular (Weil, 2005). A study by Indiana University 
followed participants in two weight-loss programs, one in a traditional gym and the other delivered 
online, found that both groups lost similar amounts of weight (The Daily Telegraph, 2011).  Social media 
is not only changing the way people participate in fitness activities (Business Wire, 2011), but also in some 
other personalized service, like tutoring, legal service, etc.  
Nowadays, an increasing number of firms have been adopted the web channel to provide their services 
(Hitt and Frei, 2002). Firms have to face the competition not only within differentiated channels, but also 
across channels. The choice to use a web channel could influence a firm’s competitive actions, which have 
been found to influence the firm’s performance and profitability (Chi et al., 2008). However, little 
research has been done on this indirect competition when both the customer heterogeneity and 
asymmetric switching cost have been considered. In this paper, we studied the competition across 
different channels on personalized service. Fitness counseling service was used for illustration purpose. 
Our model was about the fitness counseling service between an online fitness provider and a brick-and-
mortar fitness club. Two scenarios have been addressed in this paper. The first one is that firms are 
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strategic but customers are myopic, and the second one is that both the firms and customers are strategic. 
A two-stage model has been proposed to analyze the effect of customer heterogeneity and asymmetric 
switching cost on firms’ pricing strategy.  
The two assumptions that we made in this paper were: first, the marginal costs for the online firm and 
traditional gym are different; second, the switching cost from the online firm to the traditional gym is 
different with the switching cost from the traditional gym to the online firm. In other words, the switching 
costs between these two firms are asymmetric. In the case that firms are strategic but customers are 
myopic, no matter it is the online firm or the traditional firm, if one of them has the marginal cost 
advantage, which means its marginal cost is lower or equal to its competitor’s marginal cost, it can always 
charge higher price to its loyal customers, which means the “pay to switch” strategy is always the optimal 
pricing strategy for it. But if marginal cost advantage does not exist, optimal pricing strategies for these 
two firms depend on the value of their marginal cost and switching costs. Therefore, the managerial 
implication of our finding is that firms should always offer lower price to its competitors’ customers if they 
have marginal cost advantage, and they can ignore the impact of the switching costs. Otherwise, when 
they make decisions on their pricing strategies, they have to consider both the marginal costs and 
switching cost. In the other scenario where both the firms and customers are strategic, there is no such 
marginal cost advantage existing for the online firm and traditional gym. Firms have to choose their 
pricing strategies based on the value of their marginal costs and switching costs.  
In this paper, we only considered the effect of customer heterogeneity and asymmetric switching costs on 
the competition between the web channel and traditional channel. There are still some other factors we 
would like to consider in the future work. One possibility is the effect of network externality. Friends form 
some small communities or networks on these online fitness websites to motive each other, therefore, it 
would be very interesting to study the effect of network externality. Another possibility is the time effect 
on the switching cost. When customers get more and more involved in these online fitness websites, as 
time increases, their switching costs should also increase. Therefore, another interesting extension is to 
analyze how time change can affect customers’ switching costs.   
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